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BOOK REVIEWS

God, Time and Eternity, by William Lane Craig. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001. Pp. xi, 321. $105.00 (cloth).
GEOFFREY GORHAM, Macalester College
In the preface to this wide-ranging and impressive study, William Lane

Craig wonders whether the many other recent works on God's relation to
time have left him with anything to say (x). Evidently undaunted, he proceeds over the course of 284 pages to examine the issue from a variety of
perspectives, including biblical interpretation, the tensed and tenseless theories of time, the special and general theories of relativity, and contemporary cosmology. And in each of these areas he succeeds in finding something very interesting to say. Craig offers, along with incisive critical analysis covering much of the large body of recent philosophical literature, a scientifically informed defense of his own 'Ockhamist' conception of God's
temporal status. This view is that God has been temporal since the creation
of time and the universe at the Big Bang, but is atemporal sans (one mustn't
say 'before') creation. Since creation, God's time is (or coincides with) the
'cosmic time' of the expanding universe, while sans creation God exists in a
solitary, timeless, and changeless (but not immutable) state.
The book has two parts. Part I ('The Nature of Divine Eternity') is a critical
survey of arguments for and against the timelessness of God. In the first
chapter, after quickly finding the biblical evidence inconclusive, Craig carefully dissects the sixteen philosophical arguments for timelessness articulated in Brian Leftow's Time and Eternity. All but one of them he judges to be
unsound. While there is much in this long chapter that will be of use to the
divine temporalist, those with no current stake in the debate might occasionally wonder where it is all leading, since Craig's own theory is not made
fully explicit until much later in the book. The (not unpleasant) feeling is as
of having stumbled upon a second-hand copy of Leftow's book with extensive marginalia by an exceptionally perceptive reader. One problematic
assumption that seems to infect several of Leftow's arguments is that if God
is temporal then he is necessarily temporal. This assumption would imply
that a temporal God is not necessary given time is not necessary. Craig
argues convincingly that one could reject the assumption, since even if God
is temporal he could have freely chosen not to make time and the universe
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(pp. 14-5). Or one could reject the premise that the existence of time is contingent, as Newton apparently did (p. 19). Another assumption frequently
invoked by Leftow against divine temporality is that according to the fourdimensionalism of modem physics whatever is at a time is also at a place.
Craig holds that this argument depends on a reductionist conflation of
'physical time' and 'metaphysical time' (a distinction I will return to below).
One important issue that runs through several of the arguments is whether a
temporal God could continuously create time. Leftow suggests that there
seems to be an explanatory circle in supposing a temporal God creates t at t.
For the act of creation at t already presupposes that God exists at t. Craig
replies that at least on a relational theory any time t is actually 'logically posterior' to some event, such as God's action (p. 21). The one argument against
divine temporality that Craig finds promising (though not decisive) is that a
temporal being necessarily suffers the misfortune of not enjoying all of its life
at once. One could perhaps adopt the Roycean view that God's specious present covers all of time but, as Craig observes, this solution seems to have the
unhappy consequence that God could not experience his specious present
until he had endured to the end of time (p. 36).
The next three chapters take up three familiar arguments for divine
temporality: only a temporal God is a person (Ch. 2); only a temporal
God could act in the world (Ch. 3); only a temporal God could know
tensed facts, such as what time it is now (Ch. 4). Craig rejects the first
argument on the grounds that a timeless being could be conscious (of
eternal facts), rational (in the sense of not violating any epistemic
duties), and have volitions (to possess his eternal goods). On the other
hand, Craig grants that a timeless God would not have future-directed
intentions, or the pleasures of learning or anticipation. Nor would he,
qua timeless and changeless, be capable of interacting with human persons. For Craig, this merely points to the value of the Ockhamist idea
that God exists timelessly sans creation but enters into relations with
temporal events and human persons at the instant of creation (p. 53).
The argument that God could not act in the world without being in time
is sound, according to Craig, but only assuming the world's time is
tensed. If the tenseless theory of time is true, then he thinks there is no
problem about a timeless God acting in the temporal realm (pp. 108-9).
Here Craig raises a number of very strong objections against atemporalist efforts to handle the problem, such as the traditional Thomistic idea
that God does not stand in a real relation to creation, and the StumpKretzmann model of "ET-simultaneity./I But his reasons for thinking the
same problem is avoided on a tenseless theory of time are open to question. If the problem is that God's actions in the world acquire temporal
locations, then that will be so even if times have dates but not tenses. If
the problem is that God's interaction with the temporal world necessarily implies a (relational) change in God, then that will be so even if the
change is only the bringing about of different effects at different dates
rather than the bringing about of different effects at different nows. The
last of the three arguments for divine temporality is that an atemporal
God could not know what time it is now (or was or will be). Craig offers
detailed and trenchant criticisms of recent attempts to reconcile divine

522

Faith and Philosophy

atemporality and omniscience. Less compelling is his response to those
who urge that omniscience must not be expected of a perfect being.
Leftow, for example, points out that God could not know what it is like
to be a failure oneself, just as a human being could not know what it is
like to be a bat. Craig's reply, that these cases do not involve ignorance
of propositions, is beside the point, unless one is prepared to deny that
humans would really learn something by becoming aware of batty experience. Nevertheless, Craig is surely right that even if God's perfection
prevents him from knowing such things as first-personal failure, it
should not prevent him from knowing what time it is now (p. 130). He is
also obviously right that this problem does not arise for the atemporalist
if the world's time is tense less. In this respect, the tenseless theory of
time seems to offer "a way out for defenders of divine timelessness" (p.
132). Alas, according to Craig the way out is really a dead end since the
tenseless theory is false. (For details, Craig refers the reader to two companion volumes: The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (2000)
and The Tense/ess Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (2000).)
In Part II ('God and Time') Craig undertakes the large task of reconciling divine temporality, the tensed theory of time, and modern
physics. He begins with an interesting historical excursus on the theological underpinnings of Newton's conceptions of absolute space and time.
Drawing upon recent scholarship (especially by 1. B. Cohen and J. E.
McGuire) which reveals that God's relation to the physical world was an
important concern throughout Newton's life, and not just in his dotage,
Craig concludes that the "classical, Newtonian conception of time is
rooted in a theistic metaphysic" (p. 157). But this conclusion seems to be
stronger than the scholarly evidence warrants. It is one thing to
acknowledge Newton's own conviction in the famous General Scholium
that to discourse of God from the appearances of things "does certainly
belong to natural philosophy." But it is quite another thing to say that
the concept of time in his physics is "rooted" in his theism. After all, the
General Scholium discussing God and the world does not even appear
in the first edition of the Principia but only in the much later second edition. Granted Newton was not a twentieth century positivist, neither
was he a thirteenth century scholastic.
Einstein's epistemology, on the other hand, was certainly broadly
positivistic, at least around the time of the Special Theory of Relativity
(STR). And Craig argues that only excessive verificationism requires the
standard Einsteinian interpretation of STR, which prohibits absolute
simultaneity and any privileged frame of reference. He points out that
Lorentz early provided an interpretation of STR which, although empirically equivalent to Einstein's model, retains a privileged frame of reference in the form of a physically undetectable ether. Craig's provocative
and informed defense of Neo-Lorentzian models of relativity is valuable,
even apart from questions about theism. (Those interested may wish to
consult yet another recent volume by Craig: Time and the Metaphysics of
Relativity (2001).) Yet one must emphasize that if the Einsteinian and
Neo-Lorentzian models are really empirically equivalent, then
Ockham's razor should eliminate the latter for positing an empirically
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superfluous spacetime structure. On this point, Craig suggests that such
methodological constraints "can be overridden by considerations broader than the laws of motion" (p. 189). Perhaps so; but Craig spends precious little time on the important methodological question of when
metaphysical or theological considerations can "override" empirical
ones. Since he frequently uses the label "verificationist" as a club, Craig
owes the reader a more detailed explanation and defense of his own
methodological assumptions.
Craig finds in the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) a physical candidate for the privileged frame whose planes of simultaneity would constitute the "moving now" of a temporal God. This is "cosmic time": the
measure of the rate of expansion of the universe as a whole since the Big
Bang. Of course, there is a problem associating God's time too closely
with cosmic time since cosmic time depends on empirically contingent
features of the universe, such as the statistically homogenous distribution of mass-energy. If such conditions do not obtain then cosmic time
does not exist, and if they change then cosmic time itself changes. But
surely God's time would not then not exist or change. Craig insists that
such worries do not take account of the distinction (which he frequently
invokes) between God's "metaphysical time" and the universe's "physical time": metaphysical time and cosmic time are "presently coincident
though not identical" (p. 242). But it is not clear how there can be two
coincident times, any more than there can two coincident spaces. Craig
suggests: "cosmic time and metaphysical time, while radically different
in that one is physical and the other is not, pick out the same duration
under different names" (p. 244). But isn't this rather like saying that
,coriander' and 'cilantro' are radically different even though they pick
out the same herb under different names?
The final two chapters return to a problem of traditional theology:
creation ex nihilo. Craig argues, on biblical and philosophical grounds,
that the universe and (tensed) time were both created out of nothing in
the finite past. The philosophical arguments are based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of past years and the need to block the
question why God waited an infinite time before creating the universe.
If these arguments are successful and time has a beginning, it follows
that God's life has both an atemporal and a temporal stage. Sans creation, God exists alone in a timeless, unchanging state. At the first
instant of creation (the Big Bang) God is simultaneous with, but causally
prior to, the universe. After that, his time flows along with the expansion of the universe. This model is perhaps hard to grasp, and the metaphysical and physical arguments by which Craig arrives at it are difficult and complex. But although I have registered serious reservations,
the force of Craig's arguments are finally as evident as his broad learning and philosophical acumen. So it will be impossible for proponents of
other models to ignore this important contribution to philosophical theology and the philosophy of time.

